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The Next Reapportionment Revolution 
ASHIRA PELMAN OSTROW* 
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court famously imposed the one-person, one-vote re-
quirement on federal, state, and local legislatures. The doctrine rapidly resolved the 
problem of malapportioned districts. Within just a few years, legislatures across the 
nation were reapportioned to equalize the population between districts. Sadly, how-
ever, the national commitment to equal-population districts has led directly to the 
current crisis of political gerrymandering. The boundaries of equal-population dis-
tricts must be redrawn every ten years to maintain population equality. Even with 
rigid adherence to population requirements, district boundaries are easily manipu-
lated to secure incumbent seats and advance partisan interests. Redistricting is 
rightly condemned for allowing politicians to pick their voters, instead of the other 
way around. Rather than reform the redistricting process, this Article proposes elim-
inating it by using weighted voting to comply with the one-person, one-vote require-
ment. To that end, this Article identifies several innovative countywide apportion-
ment plans that use political units as electoral districts and allocate legislative votes 
to each district in proportion to its population. Weighted voting eliminates the need 
for strict population equality and enables the formation of fixed districts that reflect 
multiple dimensions of political representation. The Supreme Court’s notably flexi-
ble approach to the one-person, one-vote requirement at the local level grants local 
governments substantial discretion to experiment with local political institutions and 
electoral arrangements. Policy innovations that succeed in one locality can spread 
to others and stimulate change at the state and national level. This Article seeks to 
stimulate change at the state and national level by drawing attention to local 
weighted-voting apportionment plans. 
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In the 1960s, the Supreme Court entered the political thicket of legislative appor-
tionment to confront the problem of malapportioned districts.1 In Reynolds v. Sims,2
the Court required state legislatures to be apportioned according to population, so 
that each voter had a numerically equally weighted vote.3 The one-person, one-vote 
requirement famously triggered a reapportionment revolution.4 Within just a few 
years, legislatures across the nation were reapportioned to equalize the population 
between districts.5 Sadly, however, the national commitment to equal-population dis-
tricting has led directly to the current crisis of political gerrymandering.6 The bound-
aries of single-member, equal-population districts must be redrawn after each decen-
nial census to maintain population equality.7 Even with rigid adherence to population 
requirements, district boundaries are drawn to secure incumbent seats and advance 
partisan interests. Redistricting is rightly condemned for allowing politicians to 
choose their voters, rather than the other way around.8
Rather than reform the redistricting process, this Article proposes eliminating it 
by using weighted voting to comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement. 
Weighted voting alters the politics of legislative apportionment, avoiding endless 
battles over district lines by simply adjusting the number of votes allocated to each 
                                                                                                                
1. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199–200 (1962).  
2. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  
3. Id. at 565.  
4. See GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION,
POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966) (coining the phrase to describe the rapid 
reapportionment of legislative bodies to equalize the population of each district in response to 
the one-person, one-vote requirement).  
5. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, One Person, One Weighted Vote, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1839, 1842–
43 (2016) (explaining that following the reapportionment cases equal-population districts be-
came the norm).  
6. Id. at 1854–56.  
7. For an overview of the redistricting process, see generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010 (2009). 
8. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1854–56.
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district.9 This Article examines the evolution of countywide weighted-voting plans, 
demonstrating that local legislatures use weighted voting to maintain fixed electoral 
districts that prevent malapportionment and gerrymandering. Weighted voting can 
be used to preserve representation for whole political units, such as towns, on a 
county board. It can also be incorporated into multimember districts or equal-popu-
lation districts to equalize the numeric weight of each vote across unequal-population 
districts. Weighted voting eliminates the need for strict population equality, 
dramatically increasing the options for legislative apportionment and enabling the 
formation of electoral districts that achieve multiple districting objectives.10
In 1968, in Avery v. Midland County, the Supreme Court extended the one-person, 
one-vote requirement to local legislatures.11 Despite early apprehension over its im-
pact on local governance, the extension of the one-person, one-vote doctrine has done 
little to constrain local experimentation with government formation and electoral 
processes.12 Instead, the Court has gone out of its way to acknowledge “the immense 
pressures facing units of local government, and of the greatly varying problems with 
which they must deal,”13 and to limit its own application of the one-person, one-vote 
requirement to enable local governments to respond to local circumstances.14  
                                                                                                                
9.  Id. at 1840; see also Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political 
Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1836–37 (2012) (noting that “redistricting is bedeviled by the
sore loser problem: because new district lines can determine the electoral fates of candidates, 
political parties, and interest groups, it is usually worth their time and effort to overturn a plan 
that they do not like for the uncertain prospect of something better”).
10. This Article thus follows the recent “institutional turn in election law scholarship,” 
proposing a nonjudicial strategy for preventing gerrymandering. See generally Heather K. 
Gerken & Michael S. Kang, The Institutional Turn in Election Law Scholarship, in RACE,
REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 86, 90–100 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 
2011) (describing proposals that avoid judicial review and “harness politics to fix politics”); 
Cain, supra note 9, at 1810–11 (providing an overview of proposals designed to lessen court 
involvement by improving the political process); Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: 
Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 699 
(2006) (arguing that “[t]he need for political answers in redistricting ought to guide reform 
toward new institutional approaches”).
11. 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968). 
12. Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local 
Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 339–40 (1993) (noting concern that “rigid application 
of federal constitutional principles could deprive states and localities of the flexibility essential 
to make local governments responsive to the tremendous diversity of local conditions” but 
finding that states “retain considerable control over the organization and structure of local 
governments”); Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Government, “One Person, One Vote,” and the 
Jewish Question, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2014) (analyzing extension of one per-
son, one vote to local elections). 
13. Avery, 390 U.S. at 485.  
14. See, e.g., Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110–11 (1967) (“Viable local gov-
ernments may need many innovations, numerous combinations of old and new devices, great 
flexibility in municipal arrangements to meet changing urban conditions.”); Abate v. Mundt, 
403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971) (quoting Sailors, 387 U.S. at 110–11); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. 
of Metro. Kansas City, Mo., 397 U.S. 50, 59 (1970) (quoting Sailors, 387 U.S. at 110–11);
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Thus, while the one-person, one-vote requirement virtually eliminated variation 
in Congress and at the state level,15 local governments have continued to experiment 
with legislative apportionment and voting rights.16 In particular, some local legisla-
tures use weighted voting to comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement while 
preserving representation for fixed political subdivisions.17 Some rural counties use 
a “one town, one representative” system under which each town elects one repre-
sentative regardless of the town’s population.18 Thus, a supervisor whose town con-
tains ten percent of the total county population casts ten percent of the votes on the 
county board. The federal courts have upheld this format, explaining that this 
“method of local governance preserves not only traditional boundaries and local al-
legiances, but assures that no voter is effectively disenfranchised by reason of place 
of residence.”19
Nonetheless, in counties with district that vary substantially in population, the 
“one-town, one-representative” model can lead to constitutionally significant ine-
quality in legislative representation, or what I have previously described as functional 
                                                                                                                
accord Greenwald v. Bd. of Supervisors, 567 F. Supp. 200, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (“The flexi-
bility which is to be afforded municipal government schemes has been repeatedly 
stressed . . . .”).  
15. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1845; see also James A. Gardner, How To Do Things with 
Boundaries: Redistricting and the Construction of Politics, 11 ELECTION L.J. 399, 402 (2012); 
Jeffrey C. O’Neill, Everything That Can Be Counted Does Not Necessarily Count: The Right 
to Vote and the Choice of a Voting System, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 332 (2006); Nicholas 
O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 
1406 (2012). 
16. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Dual Resident Voting: Traditional Disenfranchisement 
and Prospects for Change, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1954, 1965 (2002) (distinguishing local elec-
tions from state and national elections); see also Steve Bickerstaff, Making Local Redistricting 
Less Political: Independent Redistricting Commissions for U.S. Cities, 13 ELECTION L.J. 419, 
421 (2014) (noting variations in municipal structure); Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local 
Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1, 3 (2006) (emphasizing the “capacity of local govern-
ments to restructure basic features of their political organization, and their interest in doing 
so”); Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under Local Law, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1039, 
1045–69 (2017) (noting local expansions of the right to vote); Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out: 
A Legal Standard for Imposing Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 
HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REV. 333, 339–43 (1998) (noting use of alternative voting systems at the 
local level); O’Neill, supra note 15, at 333 (“Local elections may be any combination of sin-
gle-member and multi-member districts.”). 
17. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1850–51 (describing emergence of weighted voting in New 
York); see also R. Alta Charo, Designing Mathematical Models to Describe One-Person, One-
Vote Compliance by Unique Governmental Structures: The Case of the New York City Board 
of Estimate, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 784 (1985) (describing use of weighted voting to 
preserve town-based representation on county board); Bernard Grofman & Howard Scarrow, 
Weighted Voting in New York, 6 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 287, 288–89 (1981) (identifying unique 
circumstances that led to weighted voting in New York). 
18. See Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1850–51.  
19. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 886 F. Supp. 242, 244 
(N.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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vote dilution.20 Consider a county in which the smallest town contains five percent 
of the population and the largest town contains forty percent of the population. If 
each town elects a single representative, residents of both towns will be 
underrepresented in different ways. Residents of the smaller town will be 
underrepresented because a legislator with fewer votes will have less political power 
and less opportunity to influence legislative outcomes.21 Residents of the larger town 
will also be underrepresented, first, because they have fewer actual representatives 
in the legislative body to advocate on their behalf and, second, because a representa-
tive serving a larger constituency will have less time to devote to each individual 
resident.22  
Counties using weighted voting address this concern in a variety of ways. Some 
combine weighted voting with roughly equal-population districts, subdividing 
densely populated cities into districts each of which elects its own representative.23
Others combine weighted voting with multimember districts, increasing the number 
of representatives each district elects in proportion to the district’s population.24 Still 
others have replaced their weighted-voting systems with equal-population districts 
when extreme inequalities in legislative representation could not be reduced.25
Remarkably, in just the few years following the 2010 census, one county adopted 
weighted voting for the first time;26 a second county voted to replace its weighted-
voting system with a county legislature;27 and several other counties modified their 
plans, tinkering with the size of the legislative body or the allocation of weighted 
votes.28  
                                                                                                                
20. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1862–64.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., CORTLAND CTY. PLANNING DEP’T, LEGISLATIVE AND ELECTION DISTRICTS
(2013); see also Slater v. Bd. of Supervisors of Cortland, 330 N.Y.S.2d 947, 948–50 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1972), aff’d, 346 N.Y.S.2d 185 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (upholding Cortland County’s 
apportionment plan); infra Part III.B.  
24. See e.g., SCHENECTADY CTY., N.Y., CHARTER art. II § 2.04(F) (2015); Michael 
Lamendola, Schenectady County Legislature Pushes for Weighted Voting, DAILY GAZETTE
(Apr. 12, 2011), https://dailygazette.com/article/2011/04/12/0412_weighted [https://perma.cc 
/AD2M-5ARB]; infra Part III.B.1. 
25. See Jackson v. Nassau Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 818 F. Supp. 509, 531–34 (E.D.N.Y. 
1993). 
26. See SCHENECTADY CTY., N.Y. CHARTER art. II, § 2.04 (2015) (amending county char-
ter to incorporate weighted voting). 
27. See MONTGOMERY CTY., N.Y. CHARTER art. 2, § 2.01 (2012) (“The County legislature 
shall consist of nine (9) members elected from single-member districts.”); see also Notice of 
Adoption, Montgomery Cty., N.Y., in LOCAL LAW FILING OF LOCAL LAW NO. 2 OF 2012, at 34 
(2012), https://www.co.montgomery.ny.us/sites/public/government/locallaws/LocalLawScans 
/023.pdf (explaining charter amendment that “change[d] county government by abolishing the 
Board of Supervisors and replacing it with a nine member Legislature . . . elected from nine 
equally sized districts,” that “eliminate the need for weighted voting and comply with the prin-
ciple of ‘one man one vote’”). 
28. CORTLAND COUNTY, N.Y., RULES OF ORDER art. XI (2014); Legislative and  
Election Districts, CORTLAND COUNTY (on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (maintaining 
1038 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:1033 
Although the Court has held that partisan gerrymandering can violate the 
Constitution, it has yet to develop a manageable standard for determining when that 
occurs.29 While the Court continues its search, this Article proposes an alternative 
apportionment strategy that prevents gerrymandering and furthers numerous district-
ing priorities that would otherwise conflict. As this Article explains, weighted-voting 
districts accomplish the seemingly impossible. They preserve political subdivisions, 
prevent gerrymandering, provide equal functional representation, increase minority 
representation, and satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement.  
Part I demonstrates that weighted voting is uniquely able to satisfy the quantitative 
one-person, one-vote requirement. Weighted-voting plans grant each district a per-
centage of the total number of votes that corresponds precisely with its percentage of 
the total population. As a result, there is zero percent deviation from population 
equality. Regardless of each district’s shape or population, weighted voting equalizes 
the numeric weight of each vote, thus satisfying the quantitative one-person, one-
vote requirement. 
Part II considers the extension of the one-person, one-vote doctrine to local elec-
tions. This Part notes that Court has tailored its application of the one-person, one-
vote requirement to accommodate a wide range of local political conditions, exempt-
ing many political units from the one-person, one-vote requirement, and granting 
local legislatures substantial discretion to craft districts that reflect local political 
preferences. This Part argues that the Court’s notably flexible approach facilitates 
local political experimentation and innovation that could, in turn, serve as a model 
for broader state and national reforms. 
Part III critically examines the evolution of weighted-voting plans. First, this Part 
analyzes the “one town, one representative” model in which each town is represented 
by a single legislator. Next, this Part identifies hybrid-weighted-voting plans that 
                                                                                                                
weighted-voting system but reducing the size of its legislature); MADISON CTY. BD. OF 
SUPERVISORS, ORGANIZATION & BOARD MEETING AGENDA FOR JANUARY 8, 2013 (2013) (on 
file with the Indiana Law Journal) (passing resolution maintaining weighted-voting 
system); Lohr McKinstry, Slight Power Shift, PRESS REPUBLICAN (Apr. 13, 2012), http:// 
www.pressrepublican.com/news/local_news/slight-power-shift/article_16140991-dc49-
5e84-aaa6-cfbda4470f50.html [https://perma.cc/AF6K-NYJU] (noting that Essex County 
adjusted the allocation of votes on its Board in accordance with the Banzhaf Index of voting 
power); Stephen Williams, Saratoga County Board Votes Against Expanding Its Ranks,
DAILY GAZETTE (Aug. 17, 2011), https://dailygazette.com/article/2011/08/17/0817 
_board [https://perma.cc/7M5T-4FKB]; JAMES R. RUHL, SARATOGA COUNTY GOVERNMENT 
FUNDAMENTALS 2 (Jan. 20, 2009) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (noting that 
Saratoga County increased the number of residents each legislator represents to avoid in-
creasing the size of its Board). 
29. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1920 (2018) (“Over the past five decades this Court 
has repeatedly been asked to decide what judicially enforceable limits, if any, the Constitution 
sets on partisan gerrymandering. Previous attempts at an answer have left few clear landmarks 
for addressing the question and have generated conflicting views both of how to conceive of 
the injury arising from partisan gerrymandering and of the appropriate role for the Federal 
Judiciary in remedying that injury.”); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 
U.S. 109 (1986); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
2018] THE NEXT REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 1039
equalize multiple dimensions of legislative representation by combining weighted-
voting with multimember or equal-population plans. Finally, this Part examines 
weighted-voting plans that equalize voting power, or the mathematic probability of 
determining the outcome of a vote, rather than the numeric weight of each vote.30  
Part IV argues that hybrid weighted-voting plans maximize the advantages of 
each apportionment system and should serve as a model for broader state and national 
reform. Equal-population and multimember districts provide equal functional repre-
sentation because each legislator represents roughly the same number of people and 
casts roughly the same number of votes. Weighted voting prevents racial and partisan 
gerrymandering, satisfying the one-person, one-vote requirement by allocating votes 
to each district in proportion to its population, rather than by redrawing the bounda-
ries of each district.  
I. WEIGHTED VOTING AND THE ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE REQUIREMENT
The Court often refers to the “one person, one vote requirement” as the “equal-
population requirement.”31 This nomenclature is misleading. The one-person, one-
vote doctrine requires mathematically equally weighted votes.32 It does not require 
equal-population districts.33 In Reynolds v. Sims,34 the Court held that a plan in which 
disparately sized districts each had a single vote in the legislative body violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.35 The Court noted that a state 
could preserve representation for political subdivisions that vary in size by increasing 
the legislative representation of more populous districts.36  
Multimember districts and weighted-voting districts are designed to preserve rep-
resentation for political subdivisions that vary in size by allocating legislative votes 
to each district in proportion to the district’s population.37 Multimember districts in-
crease the number of representatives each district elects; weighted-voting districts 
increase the number of votes each representative casts.38 To illustrate, assume that 
                                                                                                                
30. See infra Part III.C; see also John F. Banzhaf III, Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: A 
Mathematical Analysis, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 317 (1965) (developing voting power model); 
Joseph Fishkin, Weightless Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1888, 1893 (2012) (explaining that one way 
to conceptualize the “weight” of a vote is as “the probability that I might cast the decisive 
vote”).
31. See, e.g., Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 (2016) (“Wesberry and Reynolds
together instructed that jurisdictions must design both congressional and state-legislative dis-
tricts with equal populations . . . .” (emphasis added)); Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949 (2004) 
(mem.) (referring to one person, one vote as “the equal-population principle”); NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 7, at 22–45 (discussing the “constitutional 
requirement of equal population among state legislative and congressional districts”).
32. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1846–47. 
33. Id. 
34. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  
35. Id. at 568. 
36. Id. at 549. 
37. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1846–47.
38. Id. at 1847. 
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an equal-population district contains 1000 people. Its residents would elect one rep-
resentative who would cast one vote. Residents of a multimember district with 2000 
residents would elect two representatives, each of whom would cast a single vote. 
Residents of a weighted-voting district with 2000 people would elect one representa-
tive who would cast two votes. In each district, the mathematic ratio of people to 
legislative votes is 1000 to 1. Although the populations vary, the votes are numeri-
cally equal.39  
Both multimember and weighted-voting plans use proportional representation to 
equalize the weight of each vote. Because weighted voting varies the number of 
votes, rather than the number of members, it is a far more precise mathematic tool. 
A district with 6.6% of the population can be granted precisely 6.6% of the votes. It 
cannot be granted 6.6 members. In a multimember system, the number of members 
must be rounded up to 7. The rounding process can produce deviations from popula-
tion equality that exceed the constitutionally permissible threshold.
This Part demonstrates that weighted voting is uniquely able to satisfy the quan-
titative one-person, one-vote requirement.40 Subpart A briefly reviews the problem 
of malapportioned districts that gave rise to the quantitative one-person, one-vote 
doctrine. Subpart B notes that the Court regularly permits state and local apportion-
ment plans to deviate from population equality to preserve the integrity of political 
subdivisions. Thus, the Court (1) presumes that state and local apportionment plans 
that deviate by less than ten percent comply with the one-person, one-vote require-
ment and (2) permits state and local legislatures to use proportional representation to 
preserve representation for political subdivisions. 
Subpart C compares the mathematics of weighted-voting to multimember district-
ing, noting that multimember systems frequently generate impermissibly high devi-
ations from population equality or require the formation of unreasonably large legis-
latures. Subpart D considers the implications of weighted voting on other dimensions 
of legislative representation. In particular, this Subpart notes that varying the number 
of votes each legislator casts, and correspondingly, the number of people each legis-
lator represents, creates inequality in functional representation and legislator power, 
and increases the risk of minority vote dilution.  
A. The Problem of Malapportioned Districts  
In its one-person, one-vote cases, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted the problem 
of malapportioned districts.41 During the first half of the 1900s, the nation’s popula-
tion began to shift from rural to urban areas. State legislatures charged with redis-
                                                                                                                
39. Id.
40. See id. at 1846–47. 
41. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124–26 (2016) (reviewing history of the 
one-person, one-vote doctrine); see also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra 
note 7, at 105–06; Grant M. Hayden, The Supreme Court and Voting Rights: A More Complete 
Exit Strategy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 949, 950 (2005) (providing an overview of one person, one 
vote). 
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tricting state and congressional legislative districts refused to adjust district bounda-
ries to account for these demographic changes.42 Many states used legislative maps 
drawn to equalize population as it existed at the turn of the century.43 Others allocated 
a single representative to each county, regardless of its population.44 In Alabama, for 
example, an urban county with over 600,000 residents and a rural county with only 
15,000 residents each elected one representative to the state senate.45 Throughout the 
country, urban voters, who were disproportionately members of minority groups, had 
their votes numerically diluted.46  
For decades, the Supreme Court refused to intervene, holding that electoral dis-
tricting was a nonjusticiable political question.47 “The remedy for unfairness in dis-
tricting,” the Court maintained, “is to secure State legislatures that will apportion 
properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress.”48 Yet, the political process 
provided no obvious solution. Rural legislators had no incentive to adopt new maps 
that might diminish their power. Thus, in 1962, in Baker v. Carr,49 the Court entered 
the political thicket of legislative districting. In Baker, the Court overturned its earlier 
precedent and found that the Tennessee legislature’s failure to redistrict gave rise to 
a justiciable issue under the Fourteenth Amendment.50 One year later, in Gray v. 
Sanders, the Court declared that “[t]he conception of political equality . . . can mean 
only one thing—one person, one vote.”51  
The Court developed the details of the one-person, one-vote standard in the cases 
that followed. First, in Wesberry v. Sanders,52 the Court invalidated Georgia’s con-
gressional district map, under which one congressional district was “two to three 
times” larger than the others.53 The Court interpreted Article I, Section 2 of the 
Constitution, which commands that representatives be chosen “by the people of the 
several States,” to mean that “as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congres-
sional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”54 Later that same Term, in 
Reynolds v. Sims,55 the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires that state 
                                                                                                                
42. See Hayden, supra note 41, at 955 n.36 (citing PAUL T. DAVID & RALPH EISENBERG,
DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN VOTE 3 (1961)); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela 
S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA.
L. REV. 541, 543 (2004). 
43. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1123. 
44. See id. 
45. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 546 (1964) (discussing population disparities). 
46. See Hayden, supra note 41, at 955 n.36. 
47. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552, 556 (1946) (warning that courts are “not to 
enter this political thicket”). 
48. Id. at 556.  
49. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
50. Id. at 237 (“We conclude that the complaint’s allegations of a denial of equal protec-
tion present a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a 
trial and a decision.”).
51. 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). 
52. 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). 
53. Id. at 7, 18.
54. Id. at 7–8 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2).
55. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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legislative seats be apportioned on a population basis so that each person has an 
equally weighted vote.56 Finally, in Avery v. Midland County, the Supreme Court 
extended the holding in Reynolds to local legislatures, requiring cities, towns and 
counties to be apportioned on a population basis.57 Thus, by the end of the decade, 
legislatures at every level of government—federal, state, and local—were subject to 
the one-person, one-vote requirement.  
B. Equally Weighted Votes  
1. The Maximum Deviation from Population Equality 
Courts typically determine whether an apportionment plan satisfies the constitu-
tional one-person, one-vote requirement by calculating the plan’s “maximum devia-
tion from population equality.”58 The maximum deviation is the total range between 
the most over- and underrepresented districts. If the largest district is two percent 
larger than the ideal, and the smallest district is one percent smaller than the ideal, 
then the overall range, or maximum population deviation, is three percent.59 The one-
person, one-vote requirement is satisfied so long as a plan’s maximum population 
deviation falls within a constitutionally acceptable range.  
Over time, the Court has developed different numeric requirements for congres-
sional districts versus state and local legislative districts.60 At the national level, the 
Court insists that congressional districts be precisely equal.61 The Court has rejected 
the suggestion that there is a point at which population differences between congres-
sional districts are de minimus.62 Where congressional districts vary from precise 
mathematic equality, the state must either show that the variances are unavoidable or 
specifically justify the variances.63 In Karcher v. Daggett, for example, the Court 
                                                                                                                
56. Id. at 568. 
57. 390 U.S. 474, 481 (1968) (requiring county to allocate seats on a population basis).  
58. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 n.2, 1149 (2016) (“Maximum population 
deviation is the sum of the percentage deviations from perfect population equality of the most- 
and least-populated districts.”). Courts refer to this range in a variety of ways. See, e.g.,
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 99 (1997) (“overall population deviation”); Bd. of Estimate 
of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 700 (1989) (“maximum percentage deviation”); Connor v. 
Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 416 (1977) (“maximum deviation”); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 23 
(1975) (“deviation,” “variation,” and “total population variance”).
59. See also Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1124 n.2 (“[I]f the largest district is 4.5% overpopu-
lated, and the smallest district is 2.3% underpopulated, the map’s maximum population devi-
ation is 6.8%.”).
60. See id. at 1149; see also Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973) (noting that, 
while “population alone has been the sole criterion of constitutionality in congressional redis-
tricting . . . broader latitude has been afforded the States under the Equal Protection Clause in 
state legislative redistricting”).
61. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795–97 (1973) (invalidating districts that 
were not as mathematically equal as possible).  
62. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531–32 (1969) (rejecting suggestion of de 
minimis population differences among congressional districts). 
63. Id. at 531. 
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rejected New Jersey’s congressional reapportionment plan that deviated by less than 
one percent from population equality because the plan’s opponents were able to 
demonstrate that an alternative plan would have produced a slightly lower devia-
tion.64  
In state and local apportionment plans, however, the Court has adopted a more 
flexible approach, establishing a presumption of constitutionality for plans that devi-
ate by less than ten percent from population equality.65 The Court permits state and 
local districts to deviate from the ideal size to “accommodate traditional districting 
objectives,” such as “preserving the integrity of political subdivisions, maintaining 
communities of interest, and creating geographic compactness.”66 The Court has em-
braced an even more flexible approach in its review of local districting plans, cau-
tioning that “[a]n unrealistic overemphasis on raw population figures” may cause 
courts to overlook other factors more critical to an “acceptable representation and 
apportionment arrangement.”67
2. Proportional Representation in State and Local Legislatures 
Under federal law, congressional representatives must be elected from single-
member, equal-population districts.68 In contrast, state and local representatives can 
be elected from multimember districts that vary in size. In Fortson v. Dorsey,69 for 
example, the Court upheld a state redistricting plan that consisted of a mixture of 
multimember and single-member districts. The Fortson Court expressly rejected the 
claim that the Equal Protection Clause requires equal-population districts.70
Although the districts varied in size, the Court determined that the plan provided each 
person with an equally weighted vote.71 There is “clearly no mathematical disparity” 
                                                                                                                
64. 462 U.S. 725, 742–44 (1983). 
65. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1124 (“Where the maximum population deviation between the 
largest and smallest district is less than 10%, the Court has held, a state or local legislative 
map presumptively complies with the one-person, one-vote rule.”); see also Voinovich v. 
Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161 (1993) (noting a ten percent threshold); Brown v. Thomson, 462 
U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (“[A]n apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 
10% falls within this category of minor deviations.”).
66. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1124; see also Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973) 
(approving a state-legislative map with maximum population deviation of sixteen percent to 
accommodate the State’s interest in “maintaining the integrity of political subdivision lines,” 
but cautioning that this deviation “may well approach tolerable limits”); Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964) (permitting variation “based on legitimate considerations incident 
to the effectuation of a rational state policy”).
67. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749 (1973); see also Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 
182, 184–86 (1971) (stating that “slightly greater percentage deviations may be tolerable” at 
the local level because local legislative bodies have fewer representatives and smaller dis-
tricts). 
68. See 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a), (c) (2012) (requiring single-member, equal-population districts 
for congressional representatives). 
69. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).  
70. Id. at 438–39.
71. Id.
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in the weight of each vote, the Court explained, because each district elects a number 
of representatives in proportion to its population.72 As a result, the plan satisfied the 
one-person, one-vote requirement.73  
In 1971, in Whitcomb v. Chavis, the Supreme Court again held that multimember 
districts could be used to satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement.74
The plaintiffs in Whitcomb argued that multimember districts do not provide each 
person with an equal vote because a voter in a multimember district has statistically 
“more chances to determine election outcomes than does the voter in the single-
member district.”75 The Supreme Court rejected this statistical argument and held 
that multimember districts satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote require-
ment.76  
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of 
weighted voting, the lower federal courts have held that weighted voting can be used 
to satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement.77 In Roxbury Taxpayers 
Alliance v. Delaware County Board of Supervisors,78 the Second Circuit rejected the 
claim that the one-person, one-vote doctrine requires equal-population districts and 
held that weighted voting satisfies the requirement so long as votes are allocated in 
proportion to population.79 The federal courts have also required counties to adopt 
weighted-voting schemes to remedy malapportioned districts. In 2001, for example, 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York ordered Erie County to 
maintain its existing districts and use weighted voting to comply with the one-person, 
one-vote requirement.80
In addition, the Supreme Court has indirectly held that weighted voting does not 
violate the federal Equal Protection Clause. In 1973, in Franklin v. Krause,81 the New 
York Court of Appeals upheld Nassau County’s weighted-voting scheme against an 
Equal Protection challenge.82 The Franklin court emphasized the Supreme Court’s 
tolerance for flexible local governance structures and the value of preserving repre-
sentation for political subunits—towns and cities—on the County Board.83 The 
                                                                                                                
72. Id. at 437. 
73. Id. at 438–39; see also Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Burns v. Richardson, 
384 U.S. 73 (1966). 
74. 403 U.S. 124, 145 (1971).  
75. Id. at 147, 168–69.  
76. Id. at 145–47.
77. See, e.g., Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d 
Cir. 1996); Reform of Schoharie Cty. v. Schoharie Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 975 F. Supp. 191, 
194–95 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998). 
78. 80 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1996).  
79. Roxbury Taxpayers All., 80 F.3d at 48.  
80. Korman v. Giambra, No. 01-CV-0369E(SR), 2001 WL 967552, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 8, 2001); see also Abate v. Rockland Cty. Legislature, 964 F. Supp. 817, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (requiring county to comply with one-person, one-vote by redistricting or by using 
weighted voting).  
81. 298 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1973).  
82. Id. at 73. 
83. See id. at 70, 72 (noting that preserving town boundaries facilitates local taxing and 
the delivery of local services and that merging these units into equal-population districts 
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Supreme Court declined review of this decision for want of a federal question.84 This 
dismissal has been treated as a decision on the merits. That is to say that by deciding 
that weighted voting did not raise a federal question, the Supreme Court also decided 
that weighted voting does not violate the federal Equal Protection Clause.85
C. Weighted Voting as a Mathematical Tool 
Although both multimember and weighted-voting districts are designed to pre-
serve representation for political units, multimember systems frequently produce un-
constitutional deviations or require the formation of unreasonably large legisla-
tures.86 Indeed, from a mathematic perspective, multimember systems are quite 
clunky. To allocate a whole number of representatives to each district in a multimem-
ber system, the number must be rounded up or down. In Abate v. Mundt, the Supreme 
Court explained that “this need to round off ‘fractional representatives’ produces 
some variations among districts in terms of population per legislator.” 87 In a county 
districting plan where the smallest district has 100 residents, for example, a town 
with 151 residents would be allocated two representatives, while a town with 149 
residents would have only one.88 Although the population of these two towns is 
nearly identical, the first receives twice as much legislative representation as the sec-
ond.89  
In addition, multimember districts may cause the legislature to become unreason-
ably large. If a district with 100 residents elects one representative, then a district 
with 1000 residents would have ten representatives, and a district with 2000 residents 
would have twenty.90 Under a multimember districting plan considered by New York 
in the 1960s, the state assembly would have contained nearly 400 members.91 A hy-
pothetical regional government for Boston would have contained over 4000.92 There 
is an inherent tension between keeping the legislature small and keeping the devia-
tion within constitutional limits.  
Weighted voting eliminates both concerns. First, weighted-voting plans constrain 
the overall size of the legislature by limiting the number of representatives each 
                                                                                                                
“would be to sacrifice practicality for an abstraction”).
84. Franklin v. Krause, 415 U.S. 904 (1974).  
85. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 886 F. Supp. 242, 247–48
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that “[t]his type of dismissal is deemed to reach the merits of the 
case, and creates binding precedent”). 
86. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1846–47.
87. 403 U.S. 182, 184 (1971). 
88. Id.
89. Abate v. Rockland Cty. Legislature, 964 F. Supp. 817, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting 
that “the voters of the second town would elect half as many county legislators as the nearly 
identical number of voters of the third town while simultaneously having one-third less voting 
power than the voters in the first town”).
90. Id. 
91. See Banzhaf, supra note 30, at 322 n.21. 
92. Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1801 (2002). 
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district elects.93 In addition, because votes are allocated in proportion to population, 
weighted-voting plans generally do not deviate from population equality. In a 
weighted-voting plan, the deviation is calculated by comparing the “percent of total 
population represented by a given local official to the percent of weighted votes al-
located to that official.”94 If one town contains fifteen percent of the county popula-
tion and is allocated fifteen percent of the total number of votes, there is zero percent 
deviation from population equality. Similarly, a town containing 15.8% of the pop-
ulation can be allocated precisely 15.8% of the total number of votes, again produc-
ing zero percent deviation. Weighted voting consistently eliminates the deviation 
from population equality by granting each district a percentage of the votes that cor-
responds precisely to its percentage of the population.
D. Weighted Voting and Political Representation  
Weighted voting equalizes the mathematic weight of each vote by increasing the 
number of votes each district receives in proportion to its population. Although this 
is a distinct advantage for equalizing the numeric weight of each vote, it generates 
distinct inequality in other dimensions of legislative representation.95 In particular, 
this Section notes that weighted voting generates inequality in functional representa-
tion and legislator power, and increases the risk of minority vote dilution. 
1. Functional Representation 
Weighted voting systems do not provide each person with equal functional repre-
sentation.96 Weighted voting compensates for population disparities between dis-
tricts by increasing the number of votes each legislator casts. Yet, this adjustment 
accounts for only one dimension of legislative representation. Indeed, legislators do 
more than simply vote. They engage in policy making, serve on legislative commit-
tees, participate in floor debates and provide a range of constituent services. In con-
trast to the number of votes, the functional dimensions of legislative representation 
cannot be weighted. Thus, “[a] single legislator with a double vote cannot perform 
double the legislative functions, serve on double the number of committees, or main-
tain double the contact with her constituents.”97 Limiting each district to a single 
                                                                                                                
93. See, e.g., Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (noting that “the Board’s small size allows for the efficient conduct of county busi-
ness and a greater degree of flexibility than would a Board of substantially greater size”).
94. Roxbury Taxpayers All., 80 F.3d at 49 (citing League of Women Voters v. Nassau 
Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 737 F.2d 155, 170 (2d Cir. 1984)); Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1848. 
95. Ostrow, supra note 5, 1865.  
96. Id. at 1862–64.  
97. Id.; see also Briffault, supra note 12, at 408 (“A legislator from a large district may 
be given proportionately more votes than a legislator from a small district, but she cannot 
engage in proportionately more activities, devote herself to the negotiation of proportionately 
more bills, or be in proportionately more places at the same time.”); Frug, supra note 92, at 
1803 (“[T]he presence of people in the room—and not just their voting power—has an effect 
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physical representative can produce constitutionally significant inequality in legisla-
tive representation.98
2. Voting Power 
Critics of weighted voting, notably Professor John Banzhaf, have argued that 
weighted voting does not equalize each legislator’s voting power, or the mathematic 
probability determining legislative outcomes.99 Banzhaf demonstrated that weighted 
voting tends to over-represent more populous districts by granting their legislators 
voting power in excess of their population.100 So, for example, a legislator with sixty 
percent of the total number of votes will have 100% of the voting power. Although 
the legislator represents only sixty percent of the total number of people, he or she 
will have the power to determine the outcome of every decision that comes before 
the legislative body.101 The representatives of the remaining forty percent of the pop-
ulation have no power. Banzhaf argued that votes should be allocated so that each 
legislator has the power to determine the outcome of as many legislative matters as 
they would have been able to determine in a legislature composed of equal-popula-
tion districts.102 The Supreme Court, however, has rejected this argument,103 inter-
preting the Equal Protection Clause to require equally weighted, not equally power-
ful, votes.104
                                                                                                                
on the outcome. . . . Adding more people from the more populous towns would change the 
dynamic of the discussion.”).
98. See infra Part III.A.  
99. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1868–70.
100. Banzhaf, supra note 30, at 318 (arguing that “weighted voting does not allocate voting 
power among legislators in proportion to the population each represents because voting power 
is not proportional to the number of votes a legislator may cast” (emphasis in original)); see 
also John F. Banzhaf III, Multimember Electoral Districts—Do They Violate the “One Man, 
One Vote” Principle?, 75 YALE L.J. 1309, 1310 (1966) (providing a mathematical method for 
measuring voting power disparities in multimember districts); John F. Banzhaf III, One Man, 
? Votes: Mathematical Analysis of Voting Power and Effective Representation, 36 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 808, 809 (1968) (arguing that disparities in legislative voting power impact legislative 
representation). 
101. Iannucci v. Bd. of Supervisors of Wash. Cty., 229 N.E.2d 195, 199 (N.Y. 1967) (rec-
ognizing that a representative of sixty percent of the votes possesses 100% of the power). 
102. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1868–70 (describing Banzhaf’s argument and Banzhaf-based 
weighted-voting plans); see also DAN. S. FELSENTHAL & MOSHE MACHOVER, THE 
MEASUREMENT OF VOTING POWER: THEORY AND PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PARADOXES 82–
83, 142, 160 (1998) (explaining Banzhaf’s formula and noting its use in the U.S. Electoral 
College and the European Union). 
103. Bd. of Estimate of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 698 (1989) (criticizing Banzhaf’s 
voting power formula as merely a “theoretical explanation of each board member’s power to 
affect the outcome of board actions” and rejecting it as a measure of the plan’s deviation from 
population); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 147, 168–69 (rejecting mathematical theory).
104. Fishkin, supra note 30, at 1893–99 (explaining voting power theory and noting that 
the Supreme Court has rejected this approach); Jurij Toplak, Equal Voting Weight of All: 
Finally “One Person, One Vote” from Hawaii to Maine?, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 123, 153 (2008) 
(arguing that the Court’s decisions reflect its commitment to protecting an equally weighted 
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3. Minority Representation 
Weighted voting systems have the potential to suppress electoral minorities.105 In 
a weighted voting system, each representative is elected at-large, from the district as 
a whole. When representatives are elected at-large, the majority has the capacity to 
elect all of the districts representatives.106 Indeed, the Court’s primary concern with 
regard to multimember districting is not numeric vote dilution, but rather qualitative 
vote dilution resulting from the discriminatory impact on racial minorities.107 The 
Supreme Court, thus, prefers equal-population districts in court-ordered legislative 
reapportionment plans “unless the court can articulate a singular combination of 
unique factors that justifies a different result.”108
Weighted voting magnifies the risk of minority vote dilution in two ways. First, 
in a multimember district it is possible, particularly using cumulative voting or other 
alternative voting mechanisms, for a minority group to win one or two seats.109 In 
contrast, where the district elects a single representative, the majority will always 
win. Moreover, in multimember districts, the individual representatives may disagree 
with each other and cast conflicting votes.110 In a weighted-voting district, however, 
the single representative casts all her votes in a bloc, completely suppressing racial 
and political minorities within the weighted-voting district.
At-large systems will be struck down under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act if 
the court determines that it has a discriminatory impact on a geographically concen-
trated racial minority group.111 Still, at-large elections are quite common in local 
                                                                                                                
vote, not an equally powerful one). 
105. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1872–73.  
106. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47–48 (1986) (“The theoretical basis for this type 
of impairment is that where minority and majority voters consistently prefer different candi-
dates, the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the choices of 
minority voters.”). 
107. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 145 (1971) (commenting that multimember dis-
tricts are typically challenged because of their discriminatory impact, rather than because they 
fail to equalize the mathematic weight of each vote); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of  
Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 731 n.21 (1964) (approving the use of multimember systems to preserve 
representation for counties on the state legislature, but recognizing that “certain aspects of 
electing legislators at large from a county as a whole” might make it undesirable); see also 
Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1862 (distinguishing between qualitative and quantitative vote dilu-
tion claims).  
108. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977); see also Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 
690, 692 (1971) (noting the Court’s preference for single-member districts). 
109. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1875.  
110. Id.; see also Frug, supra note 92, at 1803 (noting that “electing multiple representa-
tives would allow cities to have legislators who disagree with each other”). 
111. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (amended 1982). Under 
the Thornburg v. Gingles test, a minority group that contends an apportionment plan violates 
its constitutional rights must demonstrate as follows: (1) it is sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member legislative district, (2) it 
is politically cohesive, and (3) the majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable the majority 
to usually defeat the preferred candidate of the minority. 478 U.S. at 35.
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elections. According to the National League of Cities, nearly two-thirds of all mu-
nicipalities use at-large elections in some way.112 In New York, at-large elections are 
used to elect all board members in towns, villages, and school districts, and in about 
a quarter of the cities.113 Particularly at the local level, the potential for weighted 
voting to result in minority vote dilution does not preclude its use.  
II. FEDERAL VOTING RIGHTS AND LOCAL POLITICAL INNOVATION
Local governments have long been at the forefront of political innovation, exper-
imenting with political institutions in ways that are inconceivable (and often uncon-
stitutional) at the state or federal level.114 Local governments have devised a baffling 
array of limited purpose districts and funding mechanisms to enable the provision of 
specialized public services to discrete subsets of the local population.115 They have 
sought to increase their own democratic accountability and responsiveness by intro-
ducing alternative voting systems, direct democracy, term limits, campaign finance 
reform, and ethics codes to municipal governance.116  
                                                                                                                
112. Municipal Elections, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/build-skills-and-
networks/resources/cities-101/city-officials/municipal-elections [https://perma.cc/6B45-
9VVD]; see also Paul H. Edelman, Making Votes Count in Local Elections: A Mathematical 
Appraisal of at-Large Representation, 4 ELECTION L.J. 258, 260 (2005); Kenneth A. Stahl,
The Artifice of Local Growth Politics: At-Large Elections, Ballot-Box Zoning, and Judicial 
Review, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010). 
113. Gerald Benjamin, At-Large Elections in N.Y.S. Cities, Towns, Villages, and School 
Districts and the Challenge of Growing Population Diversity, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 733, 736–
41 (2012). Professor Benjamin’s study found that at-large districting in local elections in New 
York has not reduced representation for African Americans. The study found that regardless 
of the districting system used, African American representatives have been elected in numbers 
proportionate to the size of the local African American population. Id. at 734–35. Benjamin 
notes that the same cannot be said for Hispanic populations and more recently immigrated 
groups. Id. at 735. 
114. Briffault, supra note 12, at 348–49 (noting that “local governments do not abide by 
the tripartite separation of powers characteristic of the federal and state governments”); 
Douglas, supra note 16, at 31–32 (comparing municipalities to “‘test tubes of democracy’ that 
can try out novel democratic rules, such as broadening the right to vote, on a smaller scale”); 
cf. Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 638 (2017) (an-
alyzing the potential costs and benefits of sub-federal policy experimentation). 
115. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Emerging Counties? Prospects for Regional Governance in 
the Wake of Municipal Dissolution, 122 YALE L.J.F. 187, 191–92 (2013), http://yalelawjournal 
.org/forum/emerging-counties-prospects-for-regional-governance-in-the-wake-of-municipal-
dissolution [https://perma.cc/UZZ3-AY49] (describing growth of special-purpose districts); 
see also RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 13–16 (8th ed. 2016) (describing growth and function of special-
purpose districts). 
116. Briffault, supra note 16, at 2–4 (reviewing local political innovations that enhance 
democratic accountability). 
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In contrast to the state or federal governments, local governments are easily ac-
cessible and highly responsive to local preferences and conditions.117 They continu-
ally adapt, in both substance and form, to meet the evolving needs of democratic 
governance. Like federalism more generally, local political innovation promotes par-
ticipatory democracy, increases local tailoring and government responsiveness to cit-
izen concerns, fosters a sense of community, and enables low-risk experimentation 
within the federal system.118 Moreover, local experiments can trigger action at higher 
levels of government.119 In a common pattern of innovation, “a policy first embraced 
by a city proves itself manageable and popular at the local level before percolating 
‘out’ to other cities and ‘up’ to the state level.”120 Thus, policy innovations that suc-
ceed at the local level frequently serve as a model for state and national reform..
In Avery v. Midland County, the Supreme Court extended the one-person, one-
vote requirement to local legislatures.121 In so doing, the Court recognized that some 
political subdivisions are more than mere creatures of the state. As the Court noted, 
general-purpose municipal governments, such as towns, cities, and counties, function 
as independent democratic governments, regulating autonomously in a wide variety 
of areas.122 The Equal Protection Clause, thus, requires them to meet the same stand-
ard of democratic accountability as their state and federal counterparts.123 Equally 
critically, however, the Avery Court recognized that many local political institutions 
are not equivalent to independent governments, and that in any event, local govern-
ments must have the flexibility to adapt to local conditions.124 The Court, thus, em-
phasized that the doctrine is not intended to act as a “roadblock[] in the path of inno-
vation, experiment, and development among units of local government.”125  
                                                                                                                
117. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1443 (2012). 
118. Id. at 1442 (summarizing the values of experimentation, tailoring, and political par-
ticipation in local government); see also Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” 
Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1315 
(1994) (recognizing the virtues of federalism in local governments). 
119. BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: HOW CITIES 
AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY 9–13 (2013) (de-
scribing local policy innovations that triggered state reform); Paul Diller, Intrastate 
Preemption, 87 BOS. U. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (2007) (“City policy experimentation is a catalyst 
for change at the state and national levels”); Douglas, supra note 16, at 12, 37 (arguing that 
local voting rules “can serve as catalysts for broad-reaching reforms”). 
120. Diller, supra note 119, at 1118–19. 
121. 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
122. Id. at 478. 
123. Id.
124. In the words of the Court: “Viable local governments may need many innovations, 
numerous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal arrangements to 
meet changing urban conditions.” Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110–11 (1967); see 
also Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kan. 
City, 397 U.S. 50, 59 (1969); Briffault, supra note 16, at 16–17 (noting that local governments 
adapt their governance structures in response to local conditions). 
125. Avery, 390 U.S. at 485. 
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This Part evaluates the application of the one-person, one-vote requirement to lo-
cal political institutions and argues that the Supreme Court’s flexible approach facil-
itates local policy innovation that can, in turn, stimulate state and national reform. 
Section A reviews the extension of the one-person, one-vote requirement to general-
purpose municipal legislatures. Section B emphasizes the Court’s tolerance for local 
political experimentation and tailoring, noting first, that the Court entirely exempts 
many local electoral arrangements from the one-person, one-vote requirement, and 
second, that the Court has generally upheld innovative apportionment plans designed 
by the local government to accommodate local demographics and political prefer-
ences.  
A. Local Legislatures  
The federal courts have traditionally treated local governments as administrative 
agents of the state, subject to plenary state control over their formation and power.126
As Justice Brennan once remarked, “Ours is a ‘dual system of government,’ which 
has no place for sovereign cities.”127 In the seminal case of Hunter v. City of 
Pittsburgh, the Supreme Court sustained a state law that permitted consolidation of 
two cities without the consent of the smaller of the two.128 Voters in the smaller city 
strenuously objected to the consolidation and argued that the state should require that 
a majority of each city approve the consolidation. The Supreme Court famously re-
jected this argument, characterizing local governments as “convenient agencies” cre-
ated by the state to exercise power on behalf of the state.129 Under Hunter, the state 
has “absolute discretion” over the “number, nature and duration of the powers con-
ferred upon [them] and the territory over which they shall be exercised.”130  
The Court reiterated this conception of local governments as agents of the state in 
Reynolds v. Sims.131 Alabama’s state senate was composed of one representative 
from each county within the state.132 Alabama defended its “one county, one vote” 
apportionment plan by arguing that it was modeled on the United States Senate, in 
which each state is represented equally.133 The Court, however, rejected the analogy 
to Congress. In contrast to the sovereign states, the Court maintained, political sub-
divisions are not entitled to independent representation on the legislative body.134 In 
the words of the Court: “Political subdivisions of States—counties, cities, or what-
ever— . . . have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumen-
                                                                                                                
126. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1857.  
127. Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53 (1982) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis omitted). 
128. 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (finding that the state may modify or withdraw any powers 
necessary to expanding or uniting municipalities). 
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 337 U.S. 533, 575 (1964). 
132. Id. at 543–44.
133. Id. at 571–73.
134. Id. at 568. 
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talities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental func-
tions.”135 Reynolds thus required that both houses of Alabama’s bicameral state 
legislature be apportioned on a population basis.136
If, as Hunter and Reynolds suggest, local governments are simply administrative 
agents of the state, their governing bodies are not democratic “legislatures” and 
should not be bound by the one-person, one-vote requirement.137 In Avery v. Midland 
County,138 however, the Court embraced a more nuanced view of local governments 
recognizing that, in practice, local governments exercise autonomous authority in a 
variety of policy areas.139 In Avery, the Court considered the composition of the 
Commissioners Court of Midland County, Texas, which had been districted to enable 
a tiny rural minority to elect a majority of its members.140 The Court noted that the 
government at issue performed a number of functions that generally affected the res-
idents of the county, including the imposition of countywide property taxes and the 
administration of welfare services.141 Because Midland County functioned inde-
pendently, the Court held its legislature to the same standards of democratic partici-
pation and accountability as state and federal legislatures.142 Thus, each county resi-
dent was entitled to an equally weighted vote.  
B. Local Experimentation with Democratic Governance  
In Avery v. Midland County, the Supreme Court extended the one-person, one-
vote requirement to local legislatures. From the outset, however, the Court recog-
nized that a single federal standard could not apply uniformly to the diverse and con-
stantly evolving range of local political arrangements.143 The Court has, thus, tailored 
its application of the one-person, one-vote requirement to accommodate a wide range 
of local political conditions, exempting many political units from the one-person, 
one-vote requirement, and granting local legislatures substantial discretion to craft 
districts that reflect local political preferences.  
                                                                                                                
135. Id. at 575.  
136. Id. at 568. 
137. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1857; see also Briffault, supra note 12, at 347 (arguing that 
under Hunter “a state ought to be able to design local governments along the lines it deems 
appropriate to effectuate its purposes”).
138. 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
139. Id. at 481 (noting that “the States universally leave much policy and decisionmaking 
to their governmental subdivisions”).
140. Avery, 390 U.S. at 476 (noting that the districts contained, “respectively, 67,906; 852; 
414; and 828 [people]” and that “[t]his vast imbalance resulted from placing in a single district 
virtually the entire city of Midland, Midland County’s only urban center, in which 95% of the 
county’s population resides”). 
141. Id. at 484.
142. Id. at 481. 
143. Id. 483–85.
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1. Special-Purpose Districts and Non-Legislative Bodies  
Although Avery extended the one-person, one-vote standard to general-purpose 
municipal legislatures, it was careful to note that standard might not apply to “a spe-
cial-purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions affecting de-
finable groups of constituents more than other constituents.”144 The Court has since 
exempted a variety of special districts and non-legislative bodies from the one-
person, one-vote requirement. In Salyer Land Company v. Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage District,145 for example, the Court determined that water districts fell within 
the “special-purpose district” exception to one person, one vote.146 The Salyer Court 
determined that the water storage district had “relatively limited authority” and its 
actions “disproportionately affect[ed] landowners.”147 As a result, the Court held that 
the vote could be limited to landowners. In Ball v. James,148 the Court went further, 
upholding a “one-acre, one-vote” plan that not only limited the right to vote to land-
owners, but also distributed votes to each landowner in proportion to the number of 
acres he or she owned.149 Courts have upheld similar property-based apportionment 
systems for Business Improvement Districts that are created primarily to maximize 
the value of real property within the district.150  
In addition, to special-purpose districts, the one-person, one-vote requirement 
does not apply to the election of local officials to non-legislative bodies, including 
regional and municipal advisory boards,151 local delegations to the state 
                                                                                                                
144. Id. at 483–85; see also Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kan. City, 397 U.S. 50, 
53, 56 (1970) (recognizing that some local functionaries that are “so far removed from normal 
governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different groups” that they need not 
comply). 
145. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).  
146. Id. at 720, 728 (finding one person, one vote does not apply in water district); Ball v. 
James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981) (same). 
147. Sayler, 410 U.S. at 728–29. 
148. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).  
149. Id. at 367–68; Briffault, supra note 12, at 360 (describing extension of special-purpose 
district exception to water districts with more limited authority); Stahl, supra note 112, at 31 
(describing application of doctrine to special-purpose districts).  
150. Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 960 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see 
also Burris v. Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 147, 743 F. Supp. 655, 658 (E.D. Ark. 1990) 
(upholding property-based apportionment plan for sewer district), rev’d on other grounds sub 
nom, Burris v. City of Little Rock, 941 F.2d 717 (11th Cir. 1991); Stahl, supra note 112, at 
30–31 (application of one person, one vote to business improvement districts). 
151. See Educ./Instruccion, Inc. v. Moore, 503 F.2d 1187, 1189 (2d Cir. 1974) (concluding 
that a regional council is not subject to one person, one vote because the “powers and functions 
of the councils are essentially to acquire information, to advise, to comment and to propose,” 
none of which constituted governmental functions); Polk Cty. Bd. of Supervisors v. Polk 
Commonwealth Charter Comm’n, 522 N.W.2d 783, 788–90 (Iowa 1994) (concluding that the 
Mayors’ Commission, which studies and formulates resolutions that are proposed to the 
Commonwealth Council, is not subject to the requirement of one person, one vote). 
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legislature,152 and representatives to a state constitutional convention.153 Similarly, 
the one-person, one-vote requirement does not apply if political officials are 
appointed, rather than elected.154  
2. Flexibility in Legislative Design 
The Supreme Court has adopted a notably flexible approach to reviewing local 
legislative plans. The Court has generally cautioned against a rigid focus on popula-
tion equality noting that “[a]n unrealistic overemphasis on raw population figures” 
may cause courts to overlook other factors more critical to an “acceptable represen-
tation and apportionment arrangement.”155 The Court has also held that “slightly 
greater percentage deviations may be tolerable” at the local level because local leg-
islative bodies have fewer representatives and smaller districts than their state and 
federal counterparts.156 As the Second Circuit observed, the Supreme Court’s review 
of local apportionment plans is “noteworthy for the nonpromulgation of strict math-
ematical tests,” so that at the local level the theme “has been flexibility.”157
In the 1971 case of Abate v. Mundt, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a 
multimember apportionment plan for Rockland County, New York, that was de-
signed to preserve representation for towns on a county legislature.158 Under 
Rockland County’s plan, the smallest town was allocated one representative, a town 
that was 4.3 times as large was allocated four representatives, and a town that was 
4.8 times as large was allocated five representatives.159 As a result of the rounding 
process, the plan deviated from population equality by 11.9%.160 The Court upheld 
the plan, despite the deviation, explaining that local needs “may sometimes justify 
                                                                                                                
152. DeJulio v. Georgia, 290 F.3d 1291, 1292 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that one person, 
one vote does not apply to local delegations because they do not “engage in governmental 
functions”); Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 988 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1309–12 (M.D. 
Ala. 2013), appeal dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 694 (2013) (holding that the one-person, one-vote 
requirement does not apply to local delegations); McMillan v. Love, 842 A.2d 790, 799–01
(Md. 2004) (finding county delegation is not subject to the one-person, one-vote requirement 
because the delegation only refers and recommends legislation to the Maryland General 
Assembly). 
153. Driskell v. Edwards, 413 F. Supp. 974, 977–78 (W.D. La. 1976) (concluding that “the 
principles of one-man, one-vote had no application to the selection of delegates to the 
Louisiana Constitutional Convention”).
154. Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 109 (1967) (noting one-person, one-vote does 
not apply when officials are appointed).  
155. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749 (1973).  
156. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971); see also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, supra note 7, at 146 (“The sheer number and variety of  ‘players,’ i.e., office 
holders, special interest groups and interested parties, generally is smaller in local redistricting 
than at the higher levels.”). 
157. League of Women Voters v. Nassau Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 737 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 
1984). 
158. Abate, 403 U.S. at 184–86.
159. Id. at 184 n.1.  
160. Id.
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departures from strict equality.”161 In particular, the Court explained that preserving 
representation for towns on the county legislature was a legitimate districting priority 
because it would facilitate local governance and service delivery.162  
The Abate Court recognized that multimember districting plans could produce 
large deviations from population equality, but mindful of the “experimental” nature 
of Rockland County’s plan, refused to invalidate the plan on that basis.163 Instead, 
the Court facilitated the County’s experimental use of multimember districts to pre-
serve towns as the basic unit of representation on the county legislature.  
Similarly, in Dusch v. Davis, the Supreme Court upheld an innovative apportion-
ment plan designed to meet the needs of a city containing rural and urban districts 
that varied dramatically in size.164 The City of Virginia Beach contained seven bor-
oughs that ranged in population from 1000 to 30,000. Three boroughs were urban, 
three were rural, and one, the Borough of Virginia Beach, was centered around tour-
ism. Under Virginia Beach’s “Seven-Four Plan,” four council members were elected 
at large, without regard to residence, and seven were elected at large, with one resid-
ing in each of the city’s seven boroughs.165  
Although the districts varied dramatically in size, the Court determined that the 
plan satisfied the one-person, one-vote requirement. The Court explained, the plan 
“uses boroughs in the city ‘merely as the basis of residence for candidates, not for 
voting or representation.’”166 The residency requirement assured “that this heteroge-
neous city will be able to give due consideration to questions presented throughout 
the entire area.”167 In addition, the Court suggested that the plan could serve as a 
model to balance competing interests in other similarly situated cities, noting that: 
“The Seven-Four Plan seems to reflect a detente between urban and rural communi-
ties that may be important in resolving the complex problems of the modern mega-
lopolis in relation to the city, the suburbia, and the rural countryside.”168  
The Supreme Court has also upheld local efforts to expand the relevant political 
community by extending the franchise to include nonresident property owners.169 In 
                                                                                                                
161. Id. at 185. 
162. Id.; see also Schneider v. Rockefeller, 293 N.E.2d 67, 71 n.3 (N.Y. 1972) (noting that 
flexibility may be “desirable to facilitate intergovernmental co-operation”).
163. Abate, 403 U.S. at 186 n.3 (“[W]e express no opinion on the contention that, in future 
years, the Rockland County plan may produce substantially greater deviations than presently 
exist. Such questions can be answered if and when they arise.”).
164. 387 U.S. 112, 117 (1967); see also Dallas Cty. v. Reese, 421 U.S. 477, 477 (1975) 
(upholding county legislative system that provides for countywide balloting for each of the 
four commission members, but requires that a member be elected from each of four residency 
districts); Carlson v. San Juan Cty., 333 P.3d 511 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (finding county res-
idency requirement did not violate Equal Protection Clause).
165. Dusch, 387 U.S. at 115. 
166. Id.
167. Id. at 116. 
168. Id. at 117. 
169. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Dual Resident Voting: Traditional Disenfranchisement 
and Prospects for Change, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1954, 1965 (2002) (describing expansion of 
franchise in local elections to nonresident property owners). 
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Spahos v. Mayor of Savannah Beach, one of the earliest cases dealing with nonresi-
dent enfranchisement, the Supreme Court upheld a voting scheme for a seaside resort 
town that extended the franchise to nonresidents who owned property in the town.170
The Supreme Court rejected the claim that expanding the franchise to include 
nonresidents unconstitutionally dilutes the vote of permanent residents. The Court 
determined that it was rational to include nonresident property owners, many of 
whom were summer residents, in the community’s political process.171 Thus, despite 
the extension of the one-person, one-vote requirement to local legislatures, “local 
governments still have the flexibility to organize themselves in ways that meet the 
needs of the local communities”172 and the potential to stimulate state and national 
reform.  
III. LOCAL INNOVATIONS IN LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
For the past several decades, New York’s counties have experimented with 
weighted voting, developing innovative apportionment plans that use weighed voting 
to preserve representation for political subdivisions on the county legislature. 
Traditionally, counties in New York were governed by a Board of Supervisors made 
up of the elected supervisor of each town within the county.173 In the aftermath of 
the one-person, one-vote cases, several counties preserved their Boards of 
Supervisors by allocating votes to each town supervisor in proportion to the town’s 
population. The Second Circuit has upheld this model, noting its value in preserving 
“traditional boundaries and local allegiances.”174 Still, allocating one representative 
to districts that vary substantially in population could produce significant inequality 
in legislative representation.  
As this Part explains, counties have responded to this demographic challenge in 
different ways, with different results. Some counties equalize legislative representa-
tion by incorporating weighted-voting into multimember or equal-population plans.
Weighted-equal-population plans use roughly equal-population districts, each of 
which elects its own representative to the legislature. Weighted-multimember plans 
increase the number of representatives each district elects in proportion to its popu-
                                                                                                                
170. 207 F. Supp. 688, 692 (S.D. Ga. 1962), aff’d, 371 U.S. 206, 206 (1962). Though this 
case was decided in 1962, before the major one-person, one-vote cases, courts have continued 
to rely on its holding to permit the enfranchisement of nonresident property owners in a variety 
of local elections. See, e.g., May v. Town of Mountain Vill., 132 F.3d 576, 580–81 (10th Cir. 
1997); Collins v. Town of Goshen, 635 F.2d 954, 958 (2d Cir. 1980); Brown v. Bd of 
Comm’rs, 722 F. Supp. 380, 398 (E.D. Tenn. 1989.)
171. Spahos, 207 F. Supp. at 692; see also Diebler v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 
328, 339 (3d Cir. 1986) (Sloviter, J., concurring) (describing “[t]he city’s commendable effort 
to enfranchise nonresidents and to insure nonresidents’ participation in the leadership of the 
City”). 
172. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 886 F. Supp. 242, 251 
(N.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 80 F.3d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1996)).  
173. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1850–51.  
174. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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lation. Hybrid-weighted-voting plans do not produce significant inequality in legis-
lative representation because each legislator represents roughly the same number of 
people and casts roughly the same number of votes. In 2017, a federal district court 
approved of a countywide hybrid-weighted-voting plan, finding that the plan 
satisfied the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement and provided each citizen 
with fair and effective legislative representation.175
Other counties were less concerned with disparities in legislative representation, 
and more concerned with disparities in voting power. These counties sought to equal-
ize each legislator’s voting power by apportioning votes so that each legislator would 
be able to determine the outcome of as many legislative decisions as he or she would 
be able to determine if the votes were not weighted.176 Though the New York courts 
initially required counties to use the voting power model,177 the federal courts have 
since rejected this approach,178 leaving the status of voting power plans unsettled.  
A. One Town, One Representative  
In a pair of cases decided in the late 1990s, the Second Circuit upheld two tradi-
tional countywide weighted-voting plans, under which towns with varying popula-
tions were each represented by a single representative on the board. In 1996, in 
Roxbury Taxpayers Alliance v. Delaware County Board of Supervisors,179 the 
Second Circuit upheld Delaware County’s “one town, one representative” weighted-
voting plan against an Equal Protection challenge.180 At the time of the case, 
Delaware County was made up of nineteen towns that ranged in population from 550 
to 6600.181 Each town was represented by its elected Town Supervisor, whose vote 
                                                                                                                
175. Westcott v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 1:16-CV-1088 (GTS/CFH), 2017 
WL 1532588, at *12–13 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2017). 
176. Roxbury Taxpayers All., 886 F. Supp. at 248 n.10 (“In the simple arithmetic model, 
the number of actual votes are distributed in proportion to the percentage of the total district 
population in each unit. In a Banzhaf-based model, the weighted votes are apportioned to each 
representative based on the theoretical voting power each representative should possess.”).
177. Iannucci v. Bd. of Supervisors of Wash. Cty., 229 N.E.2d 195, 199 (N.Y. 1967).
178. Jackson v. Nassau Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 818 F. Supp. 509, 532–34 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(rejecting voting power model); see also Bd. of Estimate of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 698 
(1989) (criticizing Banzhaf’s formula as merely a “theoretical explanation of each board mem-
ber's power to affect the outcome of board actions” and rejecting it as a measure of plan’s 
deviation from population); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 147, 168–69 (1971) (rejecting 
Professor Banzhaf’s mathematical theory).
179. 80 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1996).  
180. Id. at 49; see also Reform of Schoharie Cty. v. Schoharie Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 975 
F. Supp. 191, 194–95 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (upholding a substantially identical weighted-voting 
scheme in Schoharie County). 
181. 80 F.3d 42, 44. For updated statistics, see Quick Facts: Delaware County, New York,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/delawarecountynewyork [https:// 
perma.cc/9ESL-TEGU]; Quick Facts: Schoharie County, New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/schohariecountynewyork [https://perma.cc/YXG9-
XW86]. 
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was weighted in proportion to the town’s population.182 The smallest town contained 
one percent of the total county population and was allocated one percent of the total 
number of votes on the board. The largest town contained fourteen percent of the 
total county population and was allocated fourteen percent of the total number of 
votes on the board.183  
The court calculated the plan’s maximum deviation from population equality us-
ing a weighted-vote formula that compared the percent of population an official rep-
resents to the percent of votes allocated to that official.184 Because votes on the board 
were allocated in proportion to the population of each district, the plan deviated by 
less than one percent from population equality. The court thus concluded that 
Delaware County’s plan complied with the quantitative one-person, one-vote, re-
quirement.185
In addition, the Second Circuit expressly rejected the claim that the Equal 
Protection Clause requires the use of equal-population districts.186 Though the pop-
ulation of each town varied, the Second Circuit found there was nothing in the record 
to indicate that the plan did not provide “fair and effective” representation.187 To the 
contrary, the court explained that the county’s “one town, one representative” struc-
ture “assures that the interests of every town, no matter how small, are considered by 
the Board, and that no town suffers from permanent lack of representation on account 
of its size.”188  
In Reform of Schoharie County v. Schoharie County Board of Supervisors,189
which followed only two years later, the court went further, expressly rejecting the 
claim that Schoharie’s “one town, one representative” plan violates the Equal 
Protection rights of residents of larger districts, who receive less functional represen-
tation than residents of smaller districts.190 Although the towns in Schoharie County 
varied in size,191 the court determined that there was no qualitative difference in the 
                                                                                                                
182. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d. Cir. 1996) 
(noting that the plan “allocates votes among Board members based strictly on the population 
represented by each Supervisor”).
183. Id. at 45. 
184. Id. at 49 (citing League of Women Voters v. Nassau Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 737 F.2d 
155, 170 (2d Cir. 1984)) (comparing the “percent of total population represented by a given 
local official to the percent of weighted votes allocated to that official”).
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 45 (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause required equal-population districts 
and that “the County’s desire to preserve the integrity of town boundaries could not override 
that constitutional requirement”).
187. Id. at 46 (quoting Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 886 F. 
Supp. 242, 252 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 80 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
188. Id. at 49. 
189. 975 F. Supp. 191, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, No. 97-9297, 1998 WL 425911 (2d. 
Cir. Apr. 22, 1998). 
190. Id. 
191. The towns varied in size from 332 to 7270 residents. This number includes students 
from S.U.N.Y. Cobleskill. Id. at 192. The court later states that the population of the largest 
town is 5670, which presumably does not include those S.U.N.Y. students. Id. at 193 n.1. 
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voters’ access to their elected representative, or in any of the other non-voting func-
tions, such as participation in committees, legislative debate, or discussion with other 
supervisors.192 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision 
that local supervisors are likely to be able to provide “fair and effective representa-
tion” despite the fact that the towns differ in size.193  
Similarly, in its seminal case upholding weighted voting, the New York Court of 
Appeals rejected the claim that inequality in legislative representation violates the 
Equal Protection Clause.194 In Iannucci v. Board of Supervisors of Washington 
County, New York’s highest court recognized that weighted voting discriminates 
against residents of smaller districts because “representatives who cast the larger ag-
gregates of votes can be expected to have greater influence with their colleagues”195
and “necessarily have greater influence over the passage of legislation.”196 The court 
held, however, that there is “nothing unconstitutional in a disparity of influence” 
among the representatives.197
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Evenwel v. Abbott198 lends additional 
support to the claim that Equal Protection does not require that each legislator repre-
sent an equal number of people.199 In Evenwel, the Court expressly noted that “con-
stituents have no constitutional right to equal access to their elected representa-
tives.”200 The Court explained that it was reasonable to create districts that equalize 
the total number of people (as opposed to total number of eligible voters) because 
such districts promote “equitable and effective representation,” “[b]y ensuring that 
each representative is subject to requests and suggestions from the same number of 
constituents.”201 Yet, the Court did not require that districts contain an equal number 
of people. Under Evenwel, equalizing the number of constituents each legislator 
represents is a reasonable state policy, not a federal constitutional mandate.  
B. Hybrid Weighted-Voting Plans 
In Reform of Schoharie County v. Schoharie County Board of Supervisors, the 
district court upheld the county’s one-town, one-representative plan, but emphasized 
                                                                                                                
192. Although the court noted that the argument might be more persuasive in a densely 
populated county. Id. at 196. 
193. Reform of Schoharie Cty. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 97-9297, 1998 WL 
425911, at *1 (2d. Cir. Apr. 22, 1998) (“We affirm substantially for the reasons stated in [the 
district court opinion]. The arguments made by appellant in the present case are not substan-
tially different from those made, and rejected, in the similar suit brought with regard to the 
board of supervisors of Schoharie’s neighboring county, Delaware County.”).
194. Iannucci v. Bd. of Supervisors of Wash. Cty., 229 N.E.2d 195, 197–200 (N.Y. 1967). 
195. Id.  
196. Iannucci v. Bd. of Supervisors of Wash. Cty., 279 N.Y.S.2d 458, 459 (App. Div.), 
aff’d, 229 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1967).  
197. Iannucci, 229 N.E.2d at 199. 
198. 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016).  
199. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1865–66.
200. Id. at 1132 n.14. 
201. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016). 
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the uniformly rural character of the county.202 The district court noted that weighted 
voting at higher levels of government, or in more densely populated counties, could 
“lead to serious non-voting-related constitutional problems.”203 Some counties miti-
gate these problems by combining weighted-voting with multimember or equal-pop-
ulation districts. These plans equalize legislative representation because each legis-
lator represents roughly the same number of people and casts roughly the same 
number of votes. 
1. Weighted-Multimember Districts 
Some counties use weighted voting to preserve multimember districts that would 
otherwise generate impermissibly high deviations from population equality or re-
quire the formation of an unreasonably large legislative body. Rockland County, for 
example, used weighted voting to reduce the deviation produced by its multimember 
apportionment plan.204 Rockland County used its five existing towns as electoral dis-
tricts.205 Under the plan, each town was allocated a number of representatives in pro-
portion to the town’s population.206 At the time of its formation, the plan deviated 
from population equality by 11.9%.207 In its 1971 decision in Abate v. Mundt the 
Supreme Court found that the deviation was justified by the county’s desire to pre-
serve representation for its towns.208 Although the Court recognized that in future 
years, the county’s multimember districting plan “may produce substantially greater 
deviations than presently exist,” it determined that “such questions can be answered 
if and when they arise.”209  
By 1998, however, the deviation caused by Rockland County’s multimember plan 
had increased to 19.8%.210 The court determined that the increased deviation could 
no longer be justified and ordered Rockland County to reapportion its legislature to 
comply with the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement. To reduce the devi-
ation below the presumptively constitutional ten percent threshold, the County would 
have had to increase the size of its legislature to forty-two members, an increase that 
would have defeated the county’s goal of maintaining an efficient legislative body.211  
Instead, Rockland County preserved representation for its towns by incorporating 
weighted voting into its multimember apportionment plan. Under the county’s hybrid 
weighted-multimember plan, each town was allocated a total number of votes in pro-
                                                                                                                
202. 975 F. Supp. 191, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998). 
203. Id. at 194–95.
204. ROCKLAND CTY. CODE § 101-8 (1997).  
205. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
206. Id. at 184–86.
207. Id.
208. Id.; see also Schneider v. Rockefeller, 31 N.Y.S.2d 420, 429 n.3 (1972) (noting that 
flexibility may be “desirable to facilitate intergovernmental co-operation”).
209. Abate, 403 U.S. at 186 n.3.
210. Abate v. Rockland Cty. Legislature, 964 F. Supp. 817, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
211. Id.
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portion to its population. The town’s votes were then divided among the town’s rep-
resentatives.212 So, for example, if the largest town contained twenty percent of the 
total population, it would be allocated twenty percent of the total number of votes. 
Those votes would then be divided among the town’s representatives who are elected 
at large from the town as a whole.  
Rockland County’s hybrid weighted-voting reflected its desire to use its towns as 
multimember districts and its need to reduce the plan’s total deviation from popula-
tion equality. Although Rockland County later replaced its hybrid-weighted-multi-
member system with a county legislature composed of equal-population districts, its 
innovative apportionment plan continues to serve as a model for reapportionment 
reform.213 In 2010, for example, Schenectady County adopted this model to preserve 
its multimember apportionment plan. Schenectady County is governed by a county 
legislature made up of four multimember districts whose boundaries correspond to 
existing city and town boundaries.214 The city of Schenectady is divided into two 
districts and each of the other districts contains two whole towns.215 The number of 
members each district elected was adjusted after each census to reflect changes in 
the population.216
At the time of its adoption, the county legislature contained fourteen members.217
After several decades of minor fluctuation, the 2010 census revealed significant de-
mographic shifts.218 To comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement, the 
county would have had to add nine more members to the board.219 Voters objected 
to an expansion of this size. In the words of one voter: 
[A] Legislature of 24 members would work, provided we raise enough 
in additional county taxes to pay for nine new legislators and their desks 
and crowd all of this into the legislative chamber. But would even the 
League of Women Voters claim that this is a reasonable solution? I doubt 
it.220
                                                                                                                
212. ROCKLAND CTY. CODE § 101-8 (1997).  
213. Memorandum from Christopher H. Gardner, County Attorney, Schenectady, on 
Results of the 2010 Census and the Requirements of Section 2.04 of the Charter of 
Schenectady County, and the Requirements of the Federal and State Court Decisions 
Requiring One Person/One Vote to the Schenectady County Legislature (Apr. 8, 2011) (on 
file with the Indiana Law Journal) [hereinafter Memorandum from Christopher H. Gardner]; 
see also Lamendola, supra note 24.
214. Memorandum from Christopher H. Gardner, supra note 213, at 3. 
215. Id. at 2. 
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1 (noting that for the first time since 1970, Schenectady County’s population 
increased rather than decreased). 
219. Id. at 3. The County Charter limited the population deviation above or below the av-
erage population per legislator to 7.5%. SCHENECTADY CTY., N.Y., CHARTER § 2.04(f) (2001), 
amended by SCHENECTADY CTY., N.Y., CHARTER § 2.04 (2011). 
220. Edwin D. Reilly Jr., Opinion, Weighted Voting Is Probably Least Bad Solution, DAILY 
GAZETTE (May 22, 2011), https://dailygazette.com/article/2011/05/22/0522_reilly [https:// 
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At the same time, the county wanted to maintain its fixed electoral districts, first 
to preserve the integrity of its political subdivisions,221 and second, to avoid the “po-
tential mischief of single member districts which could encourage gerrymander-
ing.”222  
Rather than dramatically expand the size of its legislature, or even more dramati-
cally, replace its multimember districts with equal-population districts, the county 
used weighted voting to reduce the plan’s deviation from population equality.223
Under the County’s hybrid multimember-weighted voting plan, each district received 
a total number of votes in proportion to its population. The votes were divided among 
the district’s representatives who were elected at large. Weighted voting enabled the 
county to achieve multiple goals, including: (i) maintaining its fixed multimember 
districts, which preserved representation for its political subdivisions and prevented 
gerrymandering, and (ii) reducing its deviation from population equality without ex-
panding the size of its legislature.  
2. Weighted-Equal-Population Districts 
Cortland County uses weighted voting to preserve single-member districts that 
correspond to fixed political subdivisions and contain roughly the same number of 
people, but would not otherwise satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote re-
quirement. At the time of its formation, Cortland County’s legislature was composed 
of nineteen single-member districts that corresponded to fixed political subdivisions 
and ranged in population from 2100 to 2700 residents.224 These roughly-equal-pop-
ulation districts were formed by subdividing the city of Cortland and three more pop-
ulous suburban towns into legislative districts, and by grouping together rural towns 
with smaller populations.225 If each single-member district was granted a single vote, 
the plan would deviate from population equality by more than twenty-five percent.226
Instead, the County used weighted voting to eliminate the deviation and equalize the 
numeric weight of each vote.
The County’s hybrid-weighted-equal-population plan allocated legislative votes 
to each district in proportion to its population. The smallest district contained 4.5% 
of the population and was granted 4.5% of the votes.227 The largest district contained 
                                                                                                                
perma.cc/D66F-M2P9]. 
221. Id.
222. Memorandum from Christopher H. Gardner, supra note 213, at 3–4 (noting that main-
taining the connection between districts and political subdivisions “(i) [P]reserves the natural 
and historical political units in the county, (ii) recognized that citizens identify with the cities 
and towns through schools, PTA and other civic organizations, and (iii) further recognizes that 
such an identification of the votes with political units would be lost if a system of equal pop-
ulation districts splits some communities and artificially created others.”).
223. Id.
224. Slater v. Bd. of Supervisors of Cortland, 330 N.Y.S.2d 947, 948–50 (Sup. Ct. 1972), 
aff’d, 346 N.Y.S.2d 185 (App. Div. 1973). 
225. Id.
226. Slater, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 186. 
227. Id.
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twenty-five percent of the population and was granted twenty-five percent of the 
votes.228 Because each district received a percentage of the total number of votes that 
corresponded to its percentage of the total county population, there was no deviation 
from population equality. In addition, because each legislator represented roughly 
the same number of people, there was no significant deviation in functional repre-
sentation. There is also less of a risk that a geographically concentrated minority 
group will be submerged within a larger weighted-voting district.  
Cortland County’s weighted-equal-population plan combines the advantages of 
equal-population districting with weighted voting. As the New York court observed 
in upholding the constitutionality of Cortland’s plan: 
It unites the smaller towns possessing similarity of interests into leg-
islative districts; it divides the two larger towns into legislative districts. 
The city’s boundary is not pierced. It creates legislative districts much 
closer in population than if weighted voting were used on the basis of 
existing towns and city wards in which populations vary from 493 to 
7469.229
Voters in Cortland continue to approve of this approach. Following the 2010 cen-
sus, Cortland County considered several possible redistricting plans, one of which 
would have eliminated weighted voting.230 In 2012, the voters passed a referendum 
to maintain their weighted-equal-population system.231  
3. Multidimensional Districts 
Warren County uses weighted voting together with multimember and single-
member districts to preserve the integrity of political subdivision boundaries. Warren 
County’s weighted-apportionment plan vividly illustrates the versatility of weighted 
voting as a means of complying with the quantitative one-person, one-vote require-
ment. Warren County is comprised of eleven towns and one city that vary widely in 
population.232 The largest town contains forty-two percent of the county population,
while the smallest, contains only one percent of the county population.233 If each 
district elected one representative, whose vote was weighted in proportion to the dis-
trict’s population, there would be significant inequality in legislative representation. 
The legislator with forty-two percent of the total number of votes would dominate 
                                                                                                                
228. Id. 
229. Slater, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 950. 
230. Catherine Wilde, Smaller Legislature on Tuesday’s Ballot, CORTLAND STANDARD
(Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.cortlandstandard.net/articles/11012012n.html [https://perma.cc 
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231. See CORTLAND CTY., N.Y., RULES OF ORDER art. XI (2014); Legislative and Election 
Districts, CORTLAND COUNTY, http://www.cortland-co.org/election/LEGISLATIVE 
%20DISTRICTS%2022%20X%2036.pdf. 
232. Westcott v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 1:16-CV-1088 (GTS/CFH), 2017 
WL 1532588, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2017). 
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1064 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:1033 
the legislative agenda, but have little contact with individual voters and less time to 
serve on committees and perform non-voting functions. The legislator with only one 
percent of the vote would have significant contact with individual voters, but power-
less to determine the outcome of any legislative matters.  
 To prevent those problems, Warren County equalizes legislative representation 
in two ways. First, the largest town is a multimember district which elects five rep-
resentatives to the county board.234 The town is allocated forty-two percent of the 
total number of votes, which are divided among the town’s five representatives. Each 
representative, therefore, represents approximately eight percent of the population 
and casts eight percent of the votes.235 Second, the next largest municipality, the city 
of Glens Falls, contains 22.5% of the county population.236 The city is subdivided 
into five wards, each containing approximately 4.5% of the population. Each district 
elects a single representative who casts 4.5% of the votes on the board.237 The balance 
of the towns range from 1.1-6.2% of the population. Each town elects one 
representative whose vote is weighted in proportion to the town’s population. 238  
In Westcott v. Warren County Board of Supervisors, the district court upheld 
Warren County’s hybrid weighted-voting plan, finding that it satisfied the 
quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement and provided each citizen with fair 
and effective representation.239 Warren County’s plan equalizes the numeric weight 
of each person’s vote by allocating legislative votes to each district in proportion to 
its population. It equalizes other dimensions of legislative representation by assuring 
that each legislator represents roughly the same percentage of the population. It also 
maintains fixed electoral districts that preserve representation for political 
subdivisions and prevent gerrymandering. Warren County’s apportionment plan 
demonstrates that weighted voting can be used to create a legislature that reflects a 
more nuanced balance of political values than a legislature composed of single-
member, equal-population districts.  
C. Voting Power Plans 
Warren County’s hybrid weighted-voting plan combines weighted voting with 
multimember and single-member districts to equalize the number of constituents 
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each legislator represents and the number of votes each legislator casts. Other coun-
ties have addressed a similar demographic challenge in a very different way, with 
very different results. Nassau County, for example, used a voting-power plan to pre-
serve representation for the Town of Hempstead, which contained more than half of 
the total county population.240 In 1993, however, a federal district court rejected 
Nassau’s voting power model and ordered it to reapportion its legislature to equalize 
the numeric weight of each person’s vote. The County responded by replacing its 
Board of Supervisors with a county legislature composed of equal-population dis-
tricts.241  
Today, Nassau County’s equal-population apportionment plan suffers from the 
same crisis in partisan gerrymandering as equal-population apportionment plans 
throughout the country. Indeed in 2014, a non-partisan coalition of voting rights 
groups organized a “‘Gerrymandering Grand Prix,’ a guided caravan tour of the zany 
borders of gerrymandered Nassau County Legislature districts.”242 The director ob-
served that, “gerrymandering hurts our democracy by dividing communities, en-
trenching incumbents, and discouraging political competition and participation.”243
Perhaps this result could have been avoided if Nassau County modified, rather than 
replaced, its weighted-voting plan.  
1. Equally-Powerful Votes 
Nassau County’s weighted-voting plan long preceded the one-person, one-vote 
requirement. Like other New York counties, Nassau’s Board of Supervisors was in-
itially composed of the elected Supervisor of each of its component towns.244 In 
1917, however, the county adopted a weighted-voting plan to increase representation 
for its largest town, the Town of Hempstead.245 Under Nassau County’s weighted-
voting plan, two cities and two towns each had one member on the Board of 
Supervisors, while Hempstead had two members.246 The total number of votes on the 
Board were allocated to each district in proportion to its population.247 To prevent 
                                                                                                                
240. See Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on 
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the Town of Hempstead from dominating the Board, the County adopted a superma-
jority requirement. Hempstead was granted fourteen out of twenty-five votes, but a 
majority was defined as fifteen (rather than thirteen) out of twenty-five votes.248  
By 1968, when the Supreme Court extended the one-person, one-vote requirement 
to general purpose municipal governments, Hempstead contained fifty-seven percent 
of the county population, but was allocated only 49.6% of the vote.249 The New York 
Court of Appeals determined that this allocation violated the one-person, one-vote 
requirement and ordered the county to reapportion its legislature on a population ba-
sis.250  
Nassau County could not simply weigh the votes of each district in proportion to 
its population, because doing so would give the Town of Hempstead nearly sixty 
percent of the total number of votes on the Board. The New York Court of Appeals 
had already held that such an apportionment plan would not be valid. In Iannucci v. 
Board of Supervisors of Washington County, the court observed that:
[A] particular weighted voting plan would be invalid if 60% of the 
population were represented by a single legislator who was entitled to 
cast 60% of the votes. Although his vote would apparently be weighted 
only in proportion to the population he represented, he would actually 
possess 100% of the voting power whenever a simple majority was all 
that was necessary to enact legislation.251
The court held that weighted voting could be used to satisfy the one-person, one-
vote requirement so long as votes were distributed so that each “legislator’s voting 
power, measured by the mathematical possibility of his casting a decisive vote,” ap-
proximates the power he would have in a legislature composed of equal-population 
districts.252  
Nassau County, thus, complied with the one-person, one-vote requirement using 
a voting-power plan that allocated votes in proportion to each legislator’s voting 
power, rather than in proportion to each district’s population.253 Under Nassau 
County’s plan, Hempstead was allocated enough votes to enable it to determine the 
outcome of sixty percent of the Board’s decisions.254 This formula resulted in 
Hempstead being allocated slightly less than a majority of the total number of 
votes.255 Over the next several decades, both the New York Court of Appeals and the 
Second Circuit approved of Nassau County’s weighted-voting plan.256 In Franklin v. 
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Kraus, for example, the New York Court of Appeals noted that Nassau County’s 
plan “comports with the standards set forth in Iannucci v. Board of Supervisors of 
Washington County as closely as is possible, given the unique situation created by 
Hempstead’s size with the disparities in population among the other [districts].”257
In its 1989 decision striking down the one-borough, one-vote structure of New 
York City’s Board of Estimate, however, the Supreme Court rejected the voting 
power formula as a means of calculating a plan’s deviation from population equal-
ity.258 Although the case did not involve weighted voting, the decision called the 
constitutionality of Nassau County’s voting plan into question. If a voting power 
formula could not be used to calculate the deviation from population equality, could 
it be used to allocate votes within a weighted-voting plan?  
In Jackson v. Nassau County Board of Supervisors, the federal district court said 
no.259 Echoing the Supreme Court’s language, the Jackson court criticized the voting 
power model both for the “mathematical quagmire such a system engenders,” and, 
more importantly, because “the methodology fails to take into account other critical 
factors related to the actual daily operations of a governing body.”260  
The demographics of Nassau County thus created a structural problem. 
Population-based weighted voting would grant the Town of Hempstead more than a 
majority of votes on the Board. Yet, the voting power formula could no longer be 
used to adjust the allocation of votes on the Board. The Jackson court concluded that 
Nassau County’s weighted voting system was fundamentally flawed and ordered the 
county to adopt a reapportionment plan that complied with the one-person, one-vote 
requirement. The County eventually replaced its weighted voting system with a 
county legislature composed of equal-population districts.261  
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2. Did the Experiment End Too Soon? 
Although the federal courts reject voting power plans, they have continued to up-
hold population-based weighted-voting plans that equalize the numeric weight of 
each vote by allocating votes to each district in proportion to the district’s popula-
tion.262 Thus, Nassau County’s experiment with weighted voting leaves at least two 
questions unanswered.  
First, what is the legal status of New York’s remaining weighted-voting power 
plans? The New York Court of Appeals decision requiring counties to adopt voting 
power plans has not been overturned.263 As a result, counties in New York continue 
to use these systems. Following the 2010 census, for example, Essex County adjusted 
its allocation of votes using the voting power formula.264 In some cases, the distinc-
tion may not matter. In practice, the voting power formula often produces an alloca-
tion of votes that mirrors the allocation that would be produced if votes were distrib-
uted in proportion to population, making it possible to comply with both the federal 
and state standard.265 Nonetheless, the system is difficult to understand and expensive 
to implement. It is, at best, not necessary, and more likely, not valid.  
Second, could Nassau County have preserved its board of supervisors without the 
voting power formula by using a hybrid weighted system? Specifically, could Nassau 
have either subdivided the Town of Hempstead into roughly equal-population dis-
tricts, each of which would elect its own representative to the board (as is done in 
Cortland County), or treated the Town of Hempstead as a multimember district, in-
creasing its representatives in proportion to its population and splitting the total num-
ber of weighted votes between them (as is done in Schenectady County), or created 
its own mix of apportionment systems (as is done in Warren County)?  
Had Nassau County continued to experiment with weighted voting, it could have 
developed a plan that preserved representation for its political units and satisfied the 
one-person, one-vote requirement. Instead, like most equal-population apportion-
ment plans, Nassau County’s gerrymandered districts reflect little more than the po-
litical self-interest of the politicians who draw them. 
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between the votes allotted by the Banzhaf method . . . and those which would be allotted by 
strictly arithmetical computation”); Grofman & Scarrow, supra note 17, at 298 (noting that 
except in rare cases with extreme population deviations between districts, the allocation of 
votes based upon the Banzhaf-based model deviates only slightly from the strict arithmetic 
model). 
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IV. USING WEIGHTED VOTING TO END PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
In the United States, state legislatures are primarily responsible for redrawing the 
boundaries of state legislative and congressional electoral districts after each decen-
nial census.266 Self-interested districting is an entirely predictable byproduct of this 
process. When legislators are empowered to draw their own districts, they will inev-
itably use that power to secure their own reelection and maximize their party’s rep-
resentation in the legislature.267 In the decades before the reapportionment revolu-
tion, self-interested districting manifested through inaction. State legislatures refused 
to adjust electoral district bounds in response to widespread demographic shifts from 
rural to urban areas.268 The Supreme Court eventually intervened with its one-person, 
one-vote doctrine, requiring that legislatures be apportioned on a population basis so 
that every person has an equally weighted vote.269  
Though the one-person, one-vote doctrine resolved the problem of malappor-
tioned districts, it did not constrain self-interested districting.270 The equal-popula-
tion standard is just that: a requirement that each district contain the same number of 
people. It says nothing about who those people are or how the district lines will be 
determined. As the Supreme Court soon recognized, computerized districting and 
mapping technology “make it relatively simple to draw contiguous districts of equal 
population and at the same time to further whatever secondary goals the State has.”271  
Moreover, the normative commitment to equal-population districts means that 
state legislatures are affirmatively required to adjust district boundaries after each 
decennial census to account for demographic shifts. The redistricting process pro-
vides politicians with a regularly scheduled opportunity to manipulate district bound-
aries to secure their own reelection and maximize their party’s representation in the 
                                                                                                                
266. MICHAEL P. MCDONALD, REDISTRICTING AND COMPETITIVE DISTRICTS, IN THE 
MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY 222, 228 tbl.10-1 (Michael P. McDonald & John Samples eds., 
2006) (summarizing state districting processes); ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING (July 30, 2017),
http://redistricting.lls.edu/states.php [https://perma.cc/D293-6DZU] (discussing the redistrict-
ing processes of various states).  
267. Kang, supra note 10, at 683 (“Self-dealing incumbents can and do substitute their 
political interests as the overriding priority for redistricting in place of any broader sense of 
the public good.”); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 681
(2013) (arguing that politicians create districts that serve their self-interest). 
268.  See supra notes 41–42. 
269.  See supra notes 49–57. 
270. Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 759 
(2004) (“While the doctrine has substantially equalized the populations of legislative districts 
throughout the country, it does not directly prohibit redistricting authorities from gerryman-
dering district lines in a way that unfairly favors one political party and disfavors another.”).
271. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 733 (1983); see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 
U.S. 735, 748–49 (1973); Michael Kent Curtis, Judicial Review and Populism, 38 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 313, 324 (2003) (“New computer technology has moved the gerrymander from 
an art to a science, making it far easier to create districts of equal population with any desired 
political configuration.”); Corinna Barrett Lain, Soft Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1609, 1669 (2017) (“[S]ophisticated computer algorithms allow for the creation of voting dis-
tricts with equal population and just about any political configuration.”).
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legislature.272 Thus, in the decades since the reapportionment revolution, self-inter-
ested districting manifests through aggressive and often creative manipulation of dis-
trict lines to entrench incumbents and weaken political opponents by “packing” them 
into supermajority districts or “cracking” them between several districts.273
In the aftermath of the reapportionment cases, several states considered adopting 
statewide weighted-voting plans to comply with the quantitative one-person, one-
vote requirement without redistricting.274 Proponents argued that weighted voting 
would enable states to continue to use counties as the basic unit of representation on 
the state legislature and prevent gerrymandering.275 Critics objected that weighted 
voting generates unacceptable inequality in legislative representation.276
Representatives with more votes are simultaneously more powerful on the legislative 
body and less accessible to their constituents. Courts sided with critics, rejecting 
statewide weighted-voting plans for failing to equalize legislative representation.277  
Local legislatures, however, have continued to experiment with weighted-voting,
incorporating it into their apportionment plans to preserve fixed electoral districts 
that correspond to political subdivisions. The evolution of weighted-voting plans is 
a credit to local political innovation and participatory democracy. The Supreme 
Court has long recognized that “[v]iable local governments may need many innova-
tions, numerous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal 
arrangements to meet changing urban conditions.”278 The Court’s notably flexible 
                                                                                                                
272. Cox, supra note 270, at 759–60, 760 n.46 (citing arguments that equal-population 
districting facilitates gerrymandering); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 42, at 570–77 
(arguing that redistricting enables gerrymandering); Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, 
Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 441–42 (2015) (noting that 
districting “presents politicians with the valuable opportunity to choose their voters”); Laura 
Royden & Michael Li, Extreme Maps, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 1 (2017), https://www 
.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Extreme%20Maps%205.16.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/L345-93FG] (noting that redistricting “provides an enormous opportunity for 
politicians” to manipulate the map “to create a more favorable set of districts for themselves 
and for their party”).
273. Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan 
Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 557–64 (2011) (describing packing and cracking);
Rave, supra note 267, at 681 (describing techniques for gerrymandering); Corinna Barrett 
Lain, Soft Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1609, 1670 (2017) (redistricting permits the
party in power to “‘pack’ like-minded voters into districts to ensure that a particular party 
wins, and ‘crack’ the voting strength of the opposing party’s constituents across districts to 
ensure that it loses”). 
274. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1842–43.
275. Id.  
276. Id.  
277. See, e.g., Burns v. Gill, 316 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Haw. 1970); Bannister v. Davis, 263 F. 
Supp. 202, 209 (E.D. La. 1966); WMCA v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); 
League of Neb. Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189, 195 (D. Neb. 1962); Jackman v. 
Bodine, 43 N.J. 491 (1964); Brown v. State Election Bd., 369 P.2d 140, 149 (Okla. 1962).
278. Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110–11 (1967); see also Abate v. Mundt, 403 
U.S. 182, 185 (1971) (quoting Sailors); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kan. City, 397 
U.S. 50, 59 (1970) (quoting Sailors).
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approach to the one-person, one-vote requirement at the local level, enables local 
governments to serve as laboratories of democracy and experiment with various 
forms of political representation and voting rights. The opportunities for innovative 
governance increase exponentially at the local level, not only because there are far 
more local governments than there are states, but also because policy experiments 
that could never gain traction at the state level, can frequently find support in a 
smaller arena. In many cases, innovative policies that begin at the local level stimu-
late change at the state and national level.  
This Article seeks to stimulate such change by drawing attention to the evolution 
of hybrid weighted-voting apportionment plans. As New York counties have discov-
ered, combining weighted-voting with equal-population or multimember apportion-
ment plans enables them to harmonize districting priorities that would otherwise con-
flict. Cortland County, for example, uses weighted-voting to eliminate the deviation 
produced by its roughly-equal-population districts.279 Schenectady County recently 
incorporated weighted-voting into its multimember apportionment plan to reduce the 
plan’s deviation.280 Warren County uses weighted-voting in both ways.281  
Hybrid-weighted-voting plans maintain fixed electoral districts that preserve rep-
resentation for political subdivisions and prevent gerrymandering. These plans sat-
isfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement by granting each district a 
percentage of the total number of votes that is equal it its percentage of the total 
county population. In addition, hybrid weighted-voting plans equalize legislative 
representation by increasing the number of representatives from more populous ar-
eas.282 In a hybrid apportionment plan, each legislator represents roughly the same 
number of people and casts roughly the same number of votes. Each legislator can 
perform all his or her non-voting functions, such as serving on committees and 
providing constituent services. Each has an equal seat at the table and an opportunity 
to represent their constituents on all legislative matters. Legislator power is not arti-
ficially enhanced by the number of residents in each district.  
Moreover, combining weighted-voting with equal-population districts also re-
duces the risk of racial vote dilution. Weighted-voting systems have the potential to 
suppress racial minorities because each representative is elected at large.283 Thus, a 
geographically concentrated minority group, that would constitute a majority of an 
equal-population district, may constitute only a minority of a larger, more populous, 
weighted-voting or multimember district. As a result, the minority group may be un-
able to elect any representatives.  
The traditional remedy where at-large elections cause minority vote dilution has 
been to divide the jurisdiction into equal-population districts, each of which would 
elect just one representative.284 Yet, equal-population districting has proved vulner-
                                                                                                                
279. See supra Part III.B.1. 
280. See supra Part III.B.2. 
281. See supra Part III.B.3. 
282. See supra Part III.B.  
283. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1872–73.
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able to gerrymandering. Incorporating weighted-voting into equal-population appor-
tionment plans remedies both concerns: fixed district boundaries eliminate the risk 
that boundaries will be gerrymandered to reduce representation for racial minority 
groups, and rough population equality reduces the risk that racial minorities will be 
submerged within a larger district.  
CONCLUSION
This Article highlights local innovations in weighted voting apportionment to pro-
vide a model for broader state and national reform. In particular, this Article demon-
strates that equal-population apportionment plans maximize the advantages of each 
apportionment system: (i) weighted-voting equalizes the numeric weight of each 
vote, enabling legislatures to satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote doctrine 
while maintaining fixed electoral districts that preserve representation for political 
subdivisions and prevent gerrymandering, (ii) rough population equality mitigates 
inequalities in legislative representation by assuring that each legislator represents 
roughly the same number of people and casts roughly the same number of votes, (iii) 
rough population equality also reduces the risk of that racial minorities will be sub-
merged within a larger district.  
                                                                                                                
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 34–42 (1986) (affirming lower court ruling providing for 
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